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CORPORATIONS: GOOD FAITH DEFENSE OF
CORPORATE POLICY HELD SUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY REPURCHASE OF STOCK WITH
CORPORATE FUNDS
CORPORATIONS in every state are authorized to repurchase their own
stock,' although the power is circumscribed by statutory and equit-
able limitations. Faced with broad enabling legislation,2 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Cheff v. Mathes3 has sanctioned repurchases
of stock when authorized by a board of directors to eliminate a
"corporate raider." The court also indicated that a "good faith
belief" in the preservation of "vital" management policies would be
sufficient justification to permit the use of corporate funds and credit
in enabling existing management to perpetuate its control.4
In Cheff, minority stockholders of Holland Furnace Company
instituted a derivative action against the directors to recover cor-
porate funds appropriated for the repurchase of Holland stock.
Prior to the challenged stock purchase, the directors discovered that
a Mr. Maremont and his controlled corporations had purchased a
sizeable block of Holland stock. Investigation revealed Maremont's
poor business reputation -and his practice of realizing quick profits
by the sale or liquidation of acquired companies.5 When Maremont
made a buy-sell offer to the board of directors, they authorized the
repurchase with corporate funds." Although the directors argued
2 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5, 2.02 (1960, Supp. 1964); see
Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 825 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950);
6A FLEHrR, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 2854 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1950) [hereinafter
cted as FLETCHER].
2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1953), granting a corporation the power to purchase
and sell shares of its own stock so long as the purchase does not result in the impair-
ment of capital.
S199 A.2d 548 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1964).
'See note 25 infra.
BAn investigation of the financial and business history of Maremont and corpora-
tions controlled by him, information from "leading bank officials," and a Dunn &
Bradstreet report all indicated Maremont's active participation as a stockholder in
past liquidation activities. 199 A.2d at 551, 556.
' Holland Furnace Company purchased 155,000 shares of its stock from a corporation
controlled by Maremont. Id. at 552-53. At that time Holland had 883,585 shares
outstanding, and the board of directors either owned or controlled approximately
200,000 shares. Id. at 550. The purchase price was $14.40 per share, while the stock
closed on the previous day at $11.00. Mathes v. Cheff, 190 A.2d 524, 528 (Del. Ch.
1963). The court justified the price differential as attributable to a "control premium."
199 A.2d at 555.
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that the purchase was necessary to eliminate the threat to Holland's
corporate existence and essential business policies, the vice-chancellor
found that their primary motive was retention of control.7 The
supreme court reversed, finding that the evidence established con-
clusively that the directors were motivated by a bona fide belief that
they were protecting vital corporate policies.8
During the early years of the twentieth century, the minority
American rule prohibited corporations from purchasing their own
stock 9 under the ultra vires analysis of English courts.10 Most juris-
dictions followed the Massachusetts rule permitting solvent corpora-
tions to purchase their own shares if they acted according to the
vaguely defined standards of good faith and without prejudice to the
rights of creditors or other stockholders." A movement to modernize
the statutory law of corporations led to the enactment of provisions
restricting the majority common law rule.12 The great majority of
states now provide that the purchase may be made only from surplus
of one kind or another. 8 Some also prohibit repurchase in all cases
where the corporation is or would be thereby rendered insolvent.'4
These arbitrary standards, or a requirement of stockholder ap-
proval,' 5 may preclude the use of repurchase as an efficient procedure
7 Mathes v. Cheff, supra note 6, at 529-30.
' 199 A.2d at 556. It was necessary for the corporation to borrow substantial sums
of money from commercial lending institutions to finance the purchase. Id. at 552.
The court did not indicate, however, whether the statutory requirement of non-
impairment of capital was contravened. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1953).
9 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 256a (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE];
6A FLETCHER § 2847. See, e.g., Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanics Bank, 102
Md. 608, 620-21, 63 At. 70, 77-79 (1906); Darnell-Love Lumber Co. v. Woggs, 144
Tenn. 113, 118-25, 230 S.W. 391, 392-94 (1921).
0 oTrevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1887). The English rule is based on the
theory that to allow repurchases would condone "an indirect method of reducing the
capital stock, injuring creditors and other shareholders and allowing a corporation to
traffic in its own shares, which is ultra vires." Nemmers, The Power of a Corporation
to Purchase Its Own Stock, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 161. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
II 6A FLETCHER § 2848; Wormser, The Power of a Corporation To Acquire Its Own
Stock, 24 YALE L.J. 177, 183 (1915); 14 S.C.L.Q. 555 (1962). See, e.g., Clapp v. Peterson,
104 Ill. 26 (1882); Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37 (1873); Gilchrist v.
Highfield, 140 Wis. 476, 123 N.W. 102 (1909).
See 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 5, 2.02-.03 (1960, Supp. 1964).
18See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1953) (impairment of capital); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.13 (9) (b) (1956) (surplus); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-202 (8) (1960) (impairment
of capital); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3004 (Supp. 1961) (surplus); N.H. REy. STAT.
ANN. § 294:28 (1955) (earned surplus).
1See, e.g., ILL. ANN STAT. ch 32, § 157.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAr. § 55-52 (e) (1960).
"5South Dakota requires shareholder approval in all instances of repurchase
without exception S.D Coor § 11.0303 (1939). Louisiana and Ohio on the other
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protecting the corporation from threatened liquidation by unde-
sirable parties seeking control. Where an extreme threat of this
nature exists, power to repurchase would appear consistent with the
directors' obligation to conduct the business of the corporation in a
manner designed to promote the best interests of the corporation and
its stockholders.16
On the other hand, in those states where stockholder approval is
not required to repurchase,' 7 stockholders are not insulated from the
possibilities of prejudice at the hands of management. Although the
impossibility of concerted action by a diffuse, often disinterested,
body of stockholders may not provide effective protection against the
"corporate raider," the nature of the threat imposed by outsiders
may be overstated by incumbent directors.' By purchasing the
shares of an insurgent, the board of directors prevents his challenge
from coming to a vote, and stockholders are effectively denied the
opportunity to exercise their judgment as to which management
would best serve their interests.19 This tends to minimize managerial
responsibility and sanctions the use of corporate funds to frustrate
legitimate challenges to management policies.2 0
The only limitation imposed upon repurchase by the Delaware
statute is that capital may not be impaired.2 1  Although the statute
is permissive, Delaware courts have asserted their power to impose
hand require shareholder approval in all instances of repurchase except in connection
with enumerated transactions, e.g., collection or compromise of a debt, claim or
controversy. LA. REV. STAT. § 12:23 (1950); OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 1701.35 (Page
1964).
"I Accord, Bennett v. Propp, 187 A2d 405, 408-09 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962); Andersen v.
Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 346, 90 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1950); see
Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 54-55, 158 A.2d 136, 140-41 (Ch. 1960); Kessler, Share
Repurchases Under Modern Laws, 28 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 637 n.129 (1960). See generally
BALLANTINE § 43 at 122.
17 This includes every state except Ohio, Louisiana and South Dakota. See notes
13-15 supra and accompanying text.
18 See Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962), 62 COLUM. L. Rxv.
1096, 1100 (1962).
'62 COLUM. L. Rxv. 1096, 1101 (1962); 70 YALE L.J. 308, 313 (1960).
20 See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1486 (1958). "The courts impose
on corporate agents a fiduciary obligation to 'the corporation' not to use its assets
other than for its benefit (and, indirectly, the benefit of all its shareholders) .... "
I r & FRAMPTON, BAsic BUSINEss ASSOCIAMONs 317 (1963). See Andersen v. Albert &
J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 90 N.E.2d 541 (1950); BALLANTINE § 79.
The ostensibly analogous situation in which corporate funds are used for the
expenses of a proxy fight is distinguishable. The result of the expenditure is not to
eliminate the need for a vote as is the case in stock repurchases, but, on the contrary,
to allow the stockholders to vote intelligently. See 70 YALE L.J. 308, 315 (1960).
21 See DE.L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1953).
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equitable limitations upon repurchase authorized by incumbent
management. 22  Manipulation of corporate funds to repurchase for
personal reasons will be regarded as a breach of the directors' fi-
duciary obligation to the corporation.23  On the other hand, a good
faith belief in the existence of a substantial threat to corporate
existence will justify the purchase.2 The Cheff court extended this
latter rationale by sanctioning a good faith belief in the necessity of
repurchase to protect allegedly "vital" corporate policies.25
This extension of the good faith defense overlooks countervailing
equities. Effective opposition to management is normally generated
through the impetus of one stockholder with a large nucleus of
votes.26 The language of Cheff, however, would permit the incum-
22 See Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del.
Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960).
'
2 Accord, Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962); Kors v. Carey, 39
Del. Ch. 47, 54, 56, 158 A.2d 136, 140, 142 (1960); Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Anderson
Mfg. Co., 325 Mass. 343, 346, 90 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1950); Gilchrist v. Highfield, 140 Wis.
476, 123 N.W. 102 (1909) (dictum).
The power to issue shares has also been used to maintain control. The same
equitable limitations are imposed upon this practice as are imposed upon repurchase.
Borg v. International Silver Co., 11 F.2d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1925); Yasik v. Wachtel, 25
Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309, 313 (Ch. 1941); Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 523, 80
N.E. 430, 452 (1907); Luther v. C. J. Luther Co., 118 Wis. 112, 123, 94 N.W. 69, 72
(1903). In one case equitable limitations were imposed upon an issue of shares
pursuant to the liquidation of a subsidiary which had held shares of the parent
corporation. Macht v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 74, 194 At. 19(Ch. 1937).
Similar restrictions have been imposed upon proxy expenditures authorized by
incumbent management. The use of proxy funds to inform stockholders of the policy
issues of an election have been sustained, but the use of such funds solely to perpetuate
the directors in office violates the directors' fiduciary position. One court has recog-
nized the difficulty in applying this test. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen
Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Atl. 226 (Ch. 1934).
21 Accord, Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962); Kors v. Carey, 39
Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960); Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33
Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1952). But see Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80
N.E. 450 (1907).
2r "The fear of the defendants, according to their testimony, was not limited to the
possibility of liquidation; it included the alternate possibility of a material change in
Holland's sales policies, which the board considered vital to its future success....
[The board] believed, with justification, that there was a reasonable threat to the
continued existence of Holland, or at least existence in its present form...." 199 A.2d
at 556. (Emphasis added.) Support for this extension of the good faith test may be
found in Kors v. Carey, supra note 24.
The sales policy allegedly threatened in Cheff was that of directly employing retail
salesmen for its products, a unique practice in the furnace industry. Maremont had
indicated that this practice was not justified in terms of expense whereas management
thought the practice essential. 199 A.2d at 551.
28 See LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 37, 62 (1958), 67 YALE L.J. 1477,
1483; 70 YALE L.J. 308. 313 (1961).
Vol. 1965: 412] CORPORA TIONS
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
bent board to prevent review of their "vital" policies by buying out
threatening opposition. The right of stockholders to review incum-
bent policy and replace management at stockholders meetings2 7 is
an inadequate remedy when those who formulate policy may perpet-
uate their position with corporate funds and credit so long as they
maintain a good faith belief in its importance. 28
Furthermore, it would appear impossible for a court to dis-
tinguish between vital and less significant policies when measured
by a subjective standard of good faith belief. For example, the re-
luctance of incumbent management to pay dividends may be justified
by a good faith belief that improvement of market position necessi-
tates the retention of earnings to expand existing assets. The ques-
tion of good faith belief would be complicated by the possibility that
incumbent management could be invoking the defense (1) to justify
their primary purpose of retaining control, and (2) to prevent the
recognition of ordinary income in the form of dividends on a large
bloc of shares. 29 Moreover, the majority of stockholders might prefer
that surplus earnings be applied to dividends. It is not difficult to
conceive of other examples where alleged "vital" policies may be
inconsistent with stockholders' interests.8 0
27 See BALLANTINE § 158; 2 FLETCHER §§ 283, 285; Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings
and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer's Role, 37 VA. L. REV. 653, 656-57 (1951); 70
YALE LJ. 308, 313 (1960). Hinckley v. Swaner, 13 Utah 2d 93, 94, 368 P.2d 709, 710
(1962); Czech Catholic Union v. Satla Realty Corp., 160 Ohio St. 545, 557, 117 N.E.2d
610, 616 (1954).
Under the Delaware statute, directors must be elected at meetings, the time and
place of which are prescribed in the corporation's by-laws. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222
(1953, Supp. 1962). The failure to conduct a valid election entitles stockholders to
invoke the courts' aid in calling the meeting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 224-25 (1953).
28 Whether the threat to corporate existence or policy was in fact substantial in
Cheff is questionable. Maremont controlled approximately 17V% of the outstanding
shares whereas the incumbent board owned approximately 23%. See note 6 supra.
Thus Maremont did not possess the voting power to dominate a stockholders meeting
or elect his nominees to a controlling position on the board. Certainly, enough time
was available for the incumbent board to secure stockholder approval of the re-
purchase before Maremont acquired enough shares to accomplish his alleged purpose.
29 Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, dividends are taxed as ordinary income
to the extent they do not exceed current and accumulated earnings and profits. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301 (c) (1), 316 (a). This might not matter to the majority of
small stockholders who are entitled to exclude up to $100 of dividends received.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 116(a). But if, as in Cheff, management owned a large bloc
of shares, it might be preferable for them to deter recognition of income until capital
gains treatment could be acquired by a complete or substantially disproportionate
redemption of shares, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 302 (b) (2)- (b) (3), or liquidation of the
corporation. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 331, 346.
80 At this point it is unnecessary and impossible to enumerate all the sources of
conflict which are resolved by a determination of incumbent polic . The include
[Vol. 1965: 412
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It is perhaps for these reasons that the Delaware courts have
altered the common law rule3 1 by assigning the burden of proving
good faith to the defendant directors.3 ' The possibility of account-
ing to the corporation for the misuse of management power tends to
discourage repurchase where a demonstrable threat to the corpora-
tion does not exist, and might encourage the submission of a pro-
posed purchase to the stockholders.
Allowing directors to repurchase so long as they establish a good
faith belief in a substantial threat of liquidation appears to be a
salutary position. However, the extension of this good faith defense
to protect vital business policies creates a strong possibility that
existing management may invoke this defense as a masquerade to
perpetuate existing control. At a minimum, the Cheff court should
have required stockholder ratification of the repurchase to insure
that the good faith belief of directors would be consistent with re-
sponsible corporate government.
every decision relating to the expenditure or non-expenditure of funds, such as whether
to buy or lease, to sell or lease, to improve or sell, etc.
31 Directors are generally presumed to have acted in good faith. See Bankers Sec.
Corp. v. Kresge Dep't Stores, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 378 (D. Del. 1944); Rome v. Archer, 197
A.2d 49, 54 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1964); Isaacs v. Forer, 39 Del. Ch. 105, 108-09, 159 A.2d 295,
297 (Ch. 1960); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 56, 158 A.2d 136, 142 (Ch. 1960); Davis v.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 169, 142 At. 654, 659 (Ch. 1928).
The difficulty of meeting this burden was illustrated in McPhail v. L. S. Starrett Co.,
257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958), where the court held that even assuming the directors had
an improper purpose in mind, they could not say that the plan was intended primarily
to achieve this result. Id. at 395-96.
32 The Cheff court relied on its earlier decision in a similar case. 199 A.2d at 554.
There the court had stated: "We must bear in mind the inherent danger in the
purchase of shares with corporate funds to remove a threat to corporate policy when
a threat to control is involved.... Hence, in our opinion, the burden should be on
the directors to justify such a purchase as one primarily in the corporate interest."
Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1962).
When a board of directors enters into corporate transactions which will profit them
personally, the burden of proving good faith is on the directors. Although these cases
can be distinguished from repurchase cases in that there is no direct financial profit
to the directors involved in the latter, it does not seem harsh to extend their doctrine
to the situation before the court in Cheff. Unquestionably the directors will benefit
personally from the resulting retention of control. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
306 (1939); Zweifach v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384, 394 (M.D. Pa. 1957);
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 82, 88, 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
The court in the instant case did not hold all the directors to the same stindard of
proof. The two directors having a "clear pecuniary interest," both receiving salaries
from the corporation, were held to a different standard of proof than the others.
199 A.2d at 554-55. However, the court does not specify what standard will be required
and made no further distinction between the directors.
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